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PROCESS IMPROVEMENT IN BAE SYSTEMS AND  
THE WIDER AEROSPACE SECTOR 
 
Structured Abstract:  
 
Research paper   
 
Purpose: To research the change management processes used to implement ‘world class’ 
improvements in a major aerospace company, BAE SYSTEMS, and to propose a model for 
process improvement in the wider aerospace sector. 
Design/methodology/approach:  The research was undertaken as a longitudinal study over a 
period of five years.  A variety of research methodologies were used at various stages of the 
research including action research and observation.  Semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews were used to gather qualitative data along with documentary evidence of the 
processes being used. 
Findings: There are three key findings.  Firstly, an understanding of the production stages in 
the aerospace sector: future project; new product; sustain and return to work.  Secondly 
details of a matrix-based approach and the issues regarding its implementation in a large 
organisation are discussed.  Thirdly, a generic set of principles to aid process improvement in 
the aerospace sector is proposed. 
Research limitations/implications: Given that the study is based in one company, there are 
issues regarding the generalisation of the results.  A potential further research project would 
entail the implementation of the proposed generic principles in another aerospace 
organisation. 
Practical implications: For BAE SYSTEMS, this research project aided their understanding 
of the issues involved in rolling out a process improvement program in a large organisation.
Originality/value: Until recently, most of the research into process improvement had either 
been universalistic or aimed at another type of industry, such as the automotive industry.  
This research helps to address the specific needs of the aerospace industry.  
 
Keywords:  Aerospace industry, process improvement, change management.
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Introduction 
Many attempts have been made to create a central, well-organised method to control process 
improvement and manage change within manufacturing organisations. Examples include 
Total Quality Management (TQM), Business Process Re-engineering (BPR), Just-In-Time 
(JIT), World Class Manufacturing (WCM) and Lean Production.  As ‘new’ ideas emerge, 
many companies seek to retain their competitive stance by gaining the advantages offered by 
the implementation of these ideas.  However, it is not always obvious as to which precise 
activities a particular organisation should undertake to achieve such advantages.  Thus the 
research described in this paper was initiated by BAE SYSTEMS, (or British Aerospace as it 
then was before the merger with Marconi in 1999), as part of their attempt to implement 
WCM.  In particular, they wanted a definition of WCM, which was in vogue at that time, 
which would be appropriate to their industry.   
 
The project began with a detailed review of the literature to determine the appropriateness of 
previous WCM definitions, as summarised in the second section of this paper below.  This 
indicated that much of the previous research has tended to be universalistic in nature.   
Although the automotive industry has received extensive research attention, there was little 
evidence of similar interest in other manufacturing contexts.  Of those who have attempted 
this, Muda & Hendry (2002a, 2002b) have suggested that existing prescriptive material is not 
applicable in its entirety to all industrial contexts.  Whilst Muda & Hendry’s (2002a, 2002b) 
work is directed largely at the Make-to-Order (MTO) manufacturing sector, it is reasonable 
to hypothesise that the lack of universality which they encountered is not confined to this 
sector, but is evident elsewhere within manufacturing industry.  
 
The problem associated with universalistic research is that it ignores the unique 
characteristics, present in each industrial sector, that need to be addressed if an effective 
improvement programme is to be initiated.  The aerospace sector is characterised by highly 
advanced and complex operations.  These require a highly motivated and skilled workforce, 
high levels of manufacturing precision, and detailed co-ordination of resources and 
manufacturing effort.  In the case of BAE SYSTEMS, this co-ordination involves many 
different projects, spread over several sites, and utilising different manufacturing processes, 
practices and tooling.  The historical development of the company that lead to this level of 
complexity is described further in Barker & Hendry (1999).  Thus the research aimed to 
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identify the principles and criteria necessary for world class achievement, and the method by 
which it can be instituted in such a large and complex organisation.  As the research 
progressed, the WCM label became less fashionable and lean thinking was becoming 
increasingly widespread.  Additionally, the needs of the case study organisation changed as 
the merger and subsequent organisational restructuring took place.  Consequently, the scope 
of the project changed to become a wider process improvement project, without any specific 
label.  Once the research for BAE SYSTEMS was completed, an attempt was made to 
generalise the findings to make them applicable to the wider aerospace sector. 
 
After the literature review section below, the research methodology is described.  The 
remainder of the paper is structured around the following stages of the research.  Aspects of 
this research have been previously described in brief in Barker et al (2002): 
• A study within BAE SYSTEMS to determine what (and how) the organisation was      
currently using to structure its approach to process improvement.  This included 
further study within the organisation to review the implementation of this method of 
process improvement; 
• The derivation of a set of principles for process improvement thought to be relevant 
to BAE SYSTEMS; 
• The application of industrial type classifications to the existing set of principles 
devised for BAE SYSTEMS to render them of use within the wider context of the 
aerospace sector. 
Finally, the conclusions are given, along with issues requiring further research. 
 
Literature Review 
The literature review identified five principle approaches, which had previously been taken to 
developing process improvement strategy, focussing initially on WCM research: 
1. the practice-oriented approach, which consisted of the Japanese approach to 
manufacturing (Womack et al., 1990, 1996; Schonberger, 1986, 1996) and the concept of  
‘culture excellence’ (Kanter, 1989, 1992, 1995).  This approach includes the JIT concept 
and Schonberger’s (1996) WCM principles, which prescribe actions such as reducing set-
up times, adopting a cellular layout and involving the workforce in strategic decision 
making.  
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2. the practice-performance approach, which suggested that the identification of good 
practice depended on the measurement of how well it performed (Oliver et al. 1994, 
1996; Harrison, 1998).  Studies in this category typically compare performance of 
factories, providing valuable data regarding sectors of industry and the standards attained 
within them.  However, they have been criticised by New & Swejczewski (1995) for 
concentrating on the process sector at the expense of more sophisticated manufacturing 
organisations.  Additionally, these studies tend to offer little in the way of an indication as 
to how poor performance can be improved, and are an unrealistic guide to improvement 
for companies that are already high achievers. 
3. the management ‘fad’ concept (Pascale, 1990), which suggested that all such 
improvement initiatives are transitory and likely to be replaced in short order by the ‘next 
big thing’.   
4. the human intuition approach (Morton, 1994), which suggested that good practice is   
dependant upon the ability of humans to identify and control it.  Research in this category 
focuses primarily on issues such as empowerment of the workforce; the concept of human 
esteem and the consequent need for a change in management skills/attitudes. 
5. Lean Aerospace (Graves et al., 1999; Ward et al., 2000; Ward & Graves, 2001a, 2001b), 
distinguishable from the first category above as it includes early work addressed 
specifically at the aerospace sector. 
 
Much of the literature described, for example Womack’s (1990) description of Toyota’s 
manufacturing approaches, or Schonberger’s (1996) set of World Class Manufacturing 
(WCM) principles, does not specify industry type but tends to concentrate on the 
specification of practice mainly for mass production or make to stock (MTS) operations. 
Other approaches  - Hanson and Voss (1993, 1995) or Oliver et al. (1994, 1996) - concentrate 
on a survey approach which samples a wide variety of different organisations, but does not 
tackle the individual issues of any particular one in depth. Therefore, even though a few 
aerospace organisations (or their suppliers) have been studied, it has seldom been in 
sufficient depth to assist in the provision of a comprehensive approach to process 
improvement. Although the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) may achieve this in time, it has 
not done so to date (James-Moore and Gibbons, 1997). It has been implemented in the US 
with varying degrees of success (Graves et al., 1999; Murman et al, 2002), and study is still 
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progressing in the UK.  At present, the focus is on performance measurement in costing and 
accounting systems (Ward and Graves, 2004). 
  
Further details of the literature review summarised above are given in Barker (2003).  It was 
concluded that the aerospace sector has not received much attention in the process 
improvement literature prior to the commencement of the research resulting from the LAI.  
The research described below was carried out in parallel to that research initiative. 
 
Methodology 
The research within BAE SYSTEMS was undertaken as a longitudinal study (Saunders et al 
2000) over a period of five years, studying the changes and development within the 
organisation.  The nature of the research methodology evolved over the duration of the study.  
Initially, an action research approach was undertaken.  As described by Marsick & Watkins 
(1997), this approach is set apart from other forms of applied research by its focus on action, 
with particular regard to promoting change within the subject of the study.  At this stage, a 
researcher was actively taking part in the change process to develop and implement a matrix-
based improvement approach.  The matrix, described in detail below, included a definition of 
World Class Manufacturing.  The project involved the population of that part of the matrix as 
well as active participation in the implementation of the matrix.  Semi-structured interviews 
were used at an early stage in the development process to determine the perceived 
organisational needs and how the manufacturing processes had developed.   In addition, 
much documentary evidence was gathered, including various versions of the matrices used. 
 
However, as the needs of the organisation changed, the research evolved into more of a 
participant-observer (Gill & Johnson, 1997) and finally an observation research project in 
which the direct involvement of the researcher in the change process lessened.  This was 
largely as a result of the merger and a change in management priorities, which meant that the 
achievement of WCM became less of an urgent goal.  Thus the research became more 
focussed on insights that could be gained by observing the organisational changes taking 
place. Semi-structured interviews were again used to gather qualitative data on the effects of 
organisational change on the implementation of the process improvement matrices.  Further 
justification and description of the research methodologies employed is given in Barker 
(2003). 
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 Assessing the existing BAE SYSTEMS matrix-based approach 
In order to address the need for a process improvement model within the aerospace sector, it 
was necessary to determine what had been attempted before by the organisation, how it had 
been implemented, and how the potential users perceived it. Accordingly, the initial action 
research period involved working on manufacturing process improvement initiatives within 
the Military Aircraft division of BAE SYSTEMS. The findings showed that BAE SYSTEMS 
had approached the problem by devising a matrix-based categorisation, sorted into six main 
areas of practice: Technology, People (dealing with human resource issues), Process, 
Organisational Development, Customer Satisfaction, and Performance Indicators. These 
areas of practice were graded on an incrementally improving scale of achievement, rising 
from ‘Learner’ level to ‘World Class’ standard. This latter nomenclature led to the initial use 
of World Class Manufacturing (Keegan, 1997) as a basis for the research. This is shown in 
figure 1. 
 
Take in Figure 1 
 
For each of the key criteria, each stage of the matrix was populated with targets intended to 
attain a progressively greater level of practice and performance.  For example, Technology 
may include a paperless office and IT standardization in the short term, with the "virtual 
office" as the long term "World Class" target, whilst for People, full personal development 
plans (P.D.P.s) may be the short term goal with fully empowered employees as the long term 
target.   Over time, the factors affecting the process will change and hence the content of the 
matrices would need to be up-dated and revised accordingly. 
 
The matrix-based categorisation was structured in a hierarchical manner, so that a ‘generic’ 
matrix would control overall practice progression and performance, and under this would be 
individual matrices for each of the projects – e.g. Tornado, Eurofighter/Typhoon, Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF), and Future Offensive Avionics System (FOAS).  In addition, links between the 
different projects were sought so as to determine how one project could learn from another.  
This was achieved through the identification of a “project life cycle”, which consisted of four 
distinct phases of work that was being undertaken by the organisation. These were as 
follows: 
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 Future Project: The stage at which concepts are investigated, matched to a customer need, 
and demonstrated to the customer. This involves planning and design of the 
“demonstrator” platform, and possibly initial manufacture of pre-production 
aircraft (after an order has been secured) 
 Examples: JSF, FOAS (Future Offensive Avionics System) 
 
New Product: The production phase of a new aircraft. Pre-production aircraft are built and 
tested, and the final production specification is agreed, at which point the 
aircraft goes into full production. This stages ends after the final batch of 
aircraft is delivered 
 Example: Eurofighter/Typhoon 
 
Sustaining: The business of maintaining existing aircraft in operational service. 
Depending on the length of the production run, this stage may commence 
before New Product ends. This is the organisation’s largest source of 
business 
 Example: Harrier II, Hawk 2000 
 
Legacy/RTW: This stage deals with older aircraft, which, whilst still in service, rely on 
older technologies, and require ‘traditional skills’ to maintain them. Return 
To Work (RTW) deals with a mid-life update, re-equipping the airframe for 
an extended service life, or to perform a different function 
 Examples: (Legacy) Canberra, Tornado, Harrier I (RTW) Nimrod 
  
These phases were formed into a process cycle, which charts how each phase links with the 
next, thus linking the life cycle for each project, and creating a cycle through the four central 
engineering businesses as shown in figure 2. Thus, one project might develop skills and 
processes which can be fed forward incrementally into the next project. Furthermore, lessons 
learned at, say, New Product stage of one product could be input into the same stage of future 
projects to prevent the same problems from reoccurring.  Using this device, the case could be 
made for greater co-operation as it could be seen that if managed properly, newer projects 
would benefit directly from the experience gained on older projects. 
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 Take in Figure 2 
 
The impact of the matrix-based method of controlling process improvement 
The matrix-based model provided an interesting insight into the managerial issues behind 
developing and implementing such an approach, especially with regard to managing the 
changeover from a largely unregulated ‘ad hoc’ system to a new consolidated method. The 
matrices had originally been devised by a single manager, and then revised and enhanced by 
a committee of departmental engineering managers. This was done in collaboration with a 
central core engineering group, which was responsible for its introduction and upkeep in use. 
 
Initially, the matrices were piloted across a single site, addressing the sustaining phase of the 
product life cycle only. A short while after implementation, interviews were carried out with 
several of the engineering managers responsible for its origination, and also with some of the 
senior engineers who came into contact with it. This was to gauge the reaction to the new 
approach, to understand any problems with the method, and to see if hindsight provided 
views on how the implementation could have been better managed. The results of this survey 
were largely positive, and tended to concentrate on necessary improvements to the matrices. 
These centred on the clarity and usefulness of the improvement criteria. The main objections 
from the engineering work force (who had been introduced to the matrices by the 
departmental managers) were that the criteria was largely vague and ambiguous (i.e. too 
generic – for example, the legend ‘Benchmark results are considered to be best in class’ on 
the technology matrix failed to define what was to be benchmarked, or how it was to 
measured, and against what), and that it was poorly explained. This was partly to do with the 
fact that there had been no consultation period during the matrices’ origination, and 
consequently some of the terminology was phrased in ‘buzz-words’ (e.g. STL PDQ, meaning 
‘Support Team Leader Personal Development Questionnaire), which meant little to the 
engineering population. Furthermore, there were many acronyms which were not sufficiently 
explained. The most significant problem however was that the criteria were not broken down 
into greater detail, which meant that difficulties could be encountered when trying to apply 
them to individual jobs and tasks. 
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In addition to these faults, there were also various structural problems with the matrices. 
Some information appeared at advanced stages of the matrices without anything earlier in the 
development cycle to substantiate it. There were instances where criteria at a higher level 
matrix failed to appear on the relevant lower level ‘detailed’ version, and also instances 
where criteria appeared on the wrong matrix. These faults were corrected through a series of 
seminars and meetings attended by senior and departmental managers, and when the revised 
matrices were released back to site, there was general approval and opinion that this approach 
would be beneficial to improve manufacturing practice. 
 
At this point, the matrices were populated out across the other sites belonging to the Military 
Aircraft division, and here further problems were encountered. These stemmed largely from 
the fact that the organisational structure of the division placed individual projects (aircraft 
development programmes) at different sites. Each project required often quite different 
practices and techniques (so, for example, a modern state-of-the-art Typhoon would have one 
set of practices, whilst an older Harrier would have another). These frequently failed to relate 
to one another, and consequently (in addition to many of the issues raised at the pilot site) the 
managers at the different sites claimed that one set of improvement criteria could not be 
universally applied across all projects and that consequently the matrices were of little use. 
 
Evolving the matrix-based method 
One of the chief causes of issues being raised both during the pilot and also at wider site level 
was the ambiguity of the process improvement criteria. Although they had been designed to 
be sufficiently broad in scope so that it could be applied across the board, the matrices now 
possessed insufficient detail to be widely applied. Practices in Electrical sub-systems and 
Major component assembly, for instance, were likely to be significantly different, yet the 
matrices prescribed one standard set of criteria.  
 
In an effort to combat this, the matrices were redesigned. The resultant set bore very little 
resemblance to their predecessors. Whereas the original set possessed a generic matrix 
connecting to a set of detailed matrices (one for each of the practice streams identified on the 
generic matrix), the revised matrices possessed an entirely flat organisational structure. There 
was no generic matrix, and the practice streams of Organisational Development, Customer 
Satisfaction and Performance Indicators were either incorporated into the remaining practice 
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streams, or dispensed with and dealt with by other initiatives within the organisation. This 
left Technology, People, and Process as the streams deemed central to practice improvement. 
Additionally, the nature of the criteria used to populate the three new matrices was altered. 
Whereas previously matrix criteria had been of the ‘umbrella’ type ‘this is the aim which our 
practices should achieve’, now they were more tightly constrained, and stated ‘this is the list 
of things which need to be done to achieve this standard’. Thus ‘Identification and 
application of leading edge technology’ became ‘A highly capable, high performance, single 
pass machining process’. Moreover, the emphasis of the criteria was much more heavily 
biased towards technology and technological matters. As such, engineering systems were 
broken down into the various technologies (i.e. Airframe, Composites, Advanced Metallics, 
Tooling etc.), which were used to drive forward improvement. This highlighted that a 
significant issue in process of matrix evolution was the difficulty in attaining the right level 
of descriptiveness and detail. 
 
Unfortunately, these new matrices were never used to great effect. This was because at the 
time of their introduction, the organisation merged with Marconi Electrical Systems (MES) 
to form BAE SYSTEMS. As a result of this there was wholesale reorganisation and 
restructuring of the aircraft manufacturing business, which led to a concentration on issues 
that were non-matrix related. Furthermore, an initiative (Project Axis) was introduced 
immediately prior to the merger, which changed the structure of the Military Aircraft 
division. Prior to this, manufacturing had been organised on a site basis, with individual 
projects being based at, and using the resources assigned to, that site. Henceforth however, 
resources were assigned to the projects, which were based at whatever site was deemed to be 
appropriate. This shift of emphasis from site to project focus meant that the resources at each 
site that would be needed to maintain the matrices over a period of time were no longer in 
place, and thus the matrices ceased to be used as a matter of policy across the entire Military 
division. 
 
Despite this, when a second period of field work was done within BAE SYSTEMS, a 
surprising consensus of opinion was reached amongst the managers and engineers who were 
interviewed. The merger seemed to have created a vacuum of centralised control. The new 
matrices were found to still be in use by individual teams within engineering departments to 
structure workload, monitor progress, and set performance targets. Although, according to 
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managers the matrices had ceased to be used and were being replaced by an end-to-end 
‘cradle to grave’ lifecycle, the engineers stated that there was no sign of this happening. 
Furthermore, there was now a lack of centralised support, which meant that all teams were 
effectively acting in isolation. This would, according to the engineers, provide a significant 
barrier to the reinstatement of a widespread process improvement approach. 
 
Developing process improvement principles for BAE SYSTEMS 
Despite the fact that the revised set of BAE SYSTEMS matrices ceased to be used in their 
intended manner, they provided a great deal of information with regard to what would be 
required of a process improvement approach for the organisation. The matrices provided a 
wealth of detail relating to the needs of the organisation at the Sustaining phase of BAE 
SYSTEMS’ manufacturing operation. It was possible to use this information in conjunction 
with various approaches for manufacturing improvement (see for example Schonberger 
(1986,1996), Morton (1994), Kanter (1992), and Bolden et al. (1997)) to identify a set of 
principles for this area of operations. This was achieved by taking an interactive approach to 
relating the existing details to the BAE SYSTEMS matrices. Information was sought from 
engineers and managers as to the meaning and application of the criteria, which could then be 
mapped against the details in the literature approaches to form suitable principles. The 
research uncovered a number of instances where there appeared to be a mismatch or lack of 
commonality between the matrix-based approach and the literature. Where this was the case, 
the following questions were considered:  
 
•  What was meant by each item of matrix information (where that information did not  
     correspond to anything within the literature) 
- Was it correctly worded (it might actually be in agreement with material from the 
literature whilst appearing not to be)? 
- Why was it included – what was it intended to achieve? 
- Why was it necessary – was it actually needed? 
•  Was information presented by the literature, but not present in the matrix, relevant to the  
     aerospace sector? 
 
These issues were raised informally with the engineers and managers who had originally 
devised the matrix. In this way, it was possible to assess how the information within the 
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matrices had been originally devised, and whether on reflection (of those within the 
organisation) it was actually relevant to practice improvement strategy. The second point 
allowed an evaluation of how complete the matrices had been – the amount of information 
deemed relevant to process improvement but not present within the matrices could be used as 
a measure of the completeness of the matrices, and of how effective they were as a process 
improvement method (notwithstanding the structural, technical and usage issues outlined 
earlier). The process of discussion eventually produced a set of concepts that was both 
largely common to the matrix and the literature, and deemed relevant to the aerospace sector 
(by the engineers and managers). By following this process, it was possible to assemble a set 
of process improvement principles for the Sustaining phase of the BAE SYSTEMS lifecycle, 
by combining the matrices’ content with information from literature. This was subsequently 
approved by the organisation. 
 
In addition to producing information for the Sustaining phase of the operation, it was also 
helpful to attempt to identify principles for the other three phases of BAE SYSTEMS’ 
manufacturing cycle: Future Project, New Product, and Return to Work. A potential issue, 
however, was that the matrices had been piloted for the Sustaining phase only. Therefore a 
period of observation and general unstructured discussion with manufacturing ‘facilitators’ 
(i.e. managers and team leaders) was undertaken to gain an understanding of the activities 
and needs of the other three phases. Once this was achieved, it was then possible to map out a 
set of principles for each of the remaining three phases.  These principles were grouped under 
the following six general headings: customer relations; use of technology; work force 
relations; quality assurance; process and supplier relations. The process of devising them is 
detailed in Barker (2003). The principles are described in full in figure 3. This new set of 
principles reflected a need for highly skilled knowledge and practice at the earliest stage of 
the life cycle (Future Project), at which point the design and flight of the demonstrator takes 
place, and relations with the potential customers are initiated. This places a heavy 
reliance upon the levels of technology and technological expertise possessed by the 
organisation. Once the project moves into the New Product – that is to say aircraft production 
– phase, the emphasis moves toward process management and enhancement. This is 
complimented by stressing the integration and realisation of worth of the employee. As the 
project moves into the final two stages, Sustaining and Return to Work, the emphasis moves 
still further onto the importance of the engineer. At this point the aircraft being worked upon 
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are often from a previous generation of manufacture. As a result, it may often prove 
uneconomical to redesign the processes to enable modern manufacturing techniques to be 
employed, both in terms of extreme cost, and also the variable level of business conducted. 
As a result it is imperative that a high level of engineering skill is maintained in the 
organisation to cope with the contingencies of the older ‘legacy’ projects in addition to the 
high degree of specialisation required at the onset of project development. 
 
Take in Figure 3 
 
Generalising the Process Improvement Principles 
As was indicated earlier, one of the main aims of the research was to provide a more general 
set of process improvement principles, which could be used not only in BAE SYSTEMS, but 
also within the wider aerospace industry. In order to do this, it was necessary to study the 
different types of manufacturing to gauge what effect these would have upon the principles 
devised for BAE SYSTEMS. There have been various attempts to define the nature of 
manufacturing. Hill (1993) and Amaro et al. (1999) have provided categorisations by 
manufacturing type. Hill (1993) provides a description for the various types, Design to Order, 
Engineer to Order, Make to Order, Assemble to Order and Make to Stock. These definitions 
are somewhat at variance with the traditional descriptions of ETO, MTO, ATO, and MTS. 
This is a point highlighted by Amaro et al. (1999), who go on to provide a much more 
detailed taxonomy of manufacturing classes. In this paper, the terms ETO, MTO, ATO, and 
MTS are defined as follows: 
 
•  Engineer-to-Order (ETO): The product is individually tailored to a specification provided  
    by the customer. The design and engineering of the product is primarily the responsibility  
    of the manufacturer; 
•  Make-to-Order (MTO): The majority of the operations required to manufacture the  
    product is performed after receipt of the customer’s order. The product is customised to  
    the customer’s requirements; 
•  Assemble-to-Order (ATO): Although customised to a certain extent, this involves mainly  
    standardised manufacture and the provision of a finite number of ways in which the  
    product can be assembled; 
•  Make-to-Stock (MTS): Parts and components are manufactured prior to receipt of order  
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    and stored in readiness for use. 
 
These definitions, in addition to that provided by Muda and Hendry (2003) were used to 
identify how BAE SYSTEMS’ manufacturing life cycle could be categorised by 
manufacturing type. This is shown in figure 4. It was found that the initial stage of the 
project, Future Project, was largely ETO in nature, whilst the next stage, New Product, was 
predominantly MTO. This was because the high level design was achieved at the first stage, 
and when passed to New Product phase, the operation became the manufacture of a highly 
complex product to an existing design and set of requirements. Further through the life cycle, 
the manufacturing operation became largely ATO at Sustaining phase, where the 
maintenance undertaken consisted of the manufacture and assembly of relatively standardised 
parts. This standardisation was also evident at the Return to Work stage, where the operation 
was largely MTS, being the routine maintenance of older aircraft. This final phase also 
possesses an element of ETO however. This occurs where the customer requires an aircraft 
redesigned to perform a different purpose (an example being the transformation of Nimrod 
from Air-Sea Rescue to Airborne Early Warning). In this instance, the manufacturing process 
iterates through the design and development cycle. Therefore there exists an entirely new 
manufacturing lifecycle, albeit in microcosm within the Return to Works phase. 
 
Take in Figure 4  
 
The information provided by this analysis enabled the existing process improvement 
principles to be reassessed.  As before the new principles were grouped under six general 
headings.  To illustrate the types of change that occurred, the new versions are shown in 
figure 5 (using the same format as for the original principles described in figure 3). Of much 
use at this point was Muda and Hendry’s (2003, 2002a, 2002b) work, which relates 
specifically to the specification of process improvement principles for small manufacturing 
enterprises within the MTO field. This provided a direct comparison with the MTO areas of 
the manufacturing lifecycle (New Product phase). It was found that many of Muda and 
Hendry’s principles were relevant albeit not always directly. This was primarily because of 
the nature of the aerospace industry. For example, whilst it is necessary to promote business 
and technical ability, this must be done in a very general manner so as to avoid infringing 
customer technology and to prevent industrial espionage and theft of concept. So whilst it is 
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possible to highlight the ability to manufacture to within thousandths of an inch, it is not 
possible to describe in any depth the work that has been done for previous customers. 
Largely, however, Muda and Hendry’s set of MTO principles verified those devised for BAE 
SYSTEMS’.  
 
Take in Figure 5 
 
There was comparatively little existing work on establishing principles for each of the other 
manufacturing types. A degree of reliance was therefore placed upon descriptions from Hill 
(1993) and Amaro et al. (1999) on the essential characteristics of the various manufacturing 
types. In this way, it proved possible to judge whether criteria from the BAE SYSTEMS’ 
principles would be suitable for use within operations characterised by other manufacturing 
types. When this analysis was carried out, existing principles were found to be reasonably 
accurate for ETO, although a greater emphasis was required on reinforcing people’s 
engineering skill sets, which need to be integrated into the design and manufacturing process. 
The training of the employees is vital given the high levels of complexity often involved in 
design and manufacture. Finally, the transfer of skills from project to project can dramatically 
improve design capability throughout the organisation.  The need for research into the nature 
and the use of advanced and cutting edge technology was also recognised as key to a 
continually evolving engineering design process. Furthermore, whereas the original 
principles (figure 3) had focused on understanding the needs of the customer, the analysis of 
the ETO approach at ‘Future Projects’ phase revealed the need to promote the skill sets to 
advertise capability was of great importance. It was recognised that by involving the 
customers in design decision making, these capabilities could be shown, whilst increasing 
customer satisfaction, and reducing lead times for design and concept generation.  
 
The ‘Sustaining’ and ‘Return to Work’ phases of manufacture have the maintenance of older 
aircraft in common, and the line defining when a sustaining project becomes return to work 
can often be subjective and blurred. In these phases, ATO and MTS respectively, it was 
found that notable changes were required from the earlier MTO stage. Principally, these 
centred on the integration of key skills to enable the organisation to maintain ‘traditional’ 
practices needed whilst working on older airframes, whilst removing any lesser skilled or 
repetitive task out to sub-contract. This requires a focus on training of traditional as well as 
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current engineering methods, and a close relationship with sub-contract and material 
suppliers to ensure the sourcing of older components and the quality of sub-contract work. 
Technology was found to be less of a driver, with human skills and abilities, and maintenance 
of the engineering process being the central facets of strategy. The principles for these final 
two phases were closely linked to the principles of the original classification (figure 3). 
 
Conclusions and Further Work 
The research found that the concept of a matrix-based approach to process improvement was 
potentially a valid and useful method at a detailed level of operations. However, its success in 
use was entirely dependant upon the quality of change management processes employed to 
facilitate it.  Several significant issues were identified regarding the provision of support to 
enable the engineering population to use the matrices. The initial versions of the matrices 
were developed without consultation with the people who would use them – i.e. the engineers 
– and subsequently problems were encountered due to areas of poor description, vagueness of 
practice criteria, and confusing ‘buzz word’ phrases. Broadly, the initial matrices were too 
process focused and generic for the task in hand, and this caused significant problems when 
attempts were made to use it across the entire Military division. One of the major issues here 
was the lack of user support, for whilst meetings and forums were held, it was then left to the 
managers and engineers to return to their individual sites and use the matrices relatively 
unaided. Although the matrices were redesigned in the light of views from across the Military 
division, the merger brought a premature end to its extensive implementation. The revised 
matrices were more detailed and focused upon technology. As a consequence, the criteria 
were clearer and more closely related to the manufacturing engineering activities of the 
organisation. It is likely that this would have met the needs of the engineering population 
more successfully than the original versions, a fact proved by the use of the matrices in 
individual areas of the organisation.  
 
At a higher level, the classification of principles developed by this research has identified 
four distinct phases of operation for the aerospace sector: future project; new project; 
sustaining and return to work. It has further devised sets of principles based on a combination 
of literature, existing organisation methods, and knowledge gained through discussion and 
observation, which are intended for use in each of the four phases. The four phases and their 
identification is in itself a useful descriptor of the aerospace industry.   
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 In terms of future research, in order to further validate this approach, there would need to be 
a further trial of the matrix-based concept in a predominantly stable manufacturing 
environment. This would focus on the definition of principles and criteria, and the provision 
of in depth centrally based support for the approach during its use. Additionally, there is a 
need to trial the principles for manufacturing improvement developed during this research 
within the matrix structure. In essence, these represent a first attempt at a definition to 
include, and therefore need to be refined and adjusted over time. Therefore, in order to 
determine how they can be adapted to fit differing manufacturing environments, and to 
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Figure 1 : BAE SYSTEMS’ original Matrix-based approach to manufacturing process improvement 
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Figure 4: BAE SYSTEMS’ manufacturing life cycle 
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Figure 5 (continued): The revised principles for WCM in the aerospace sector 
 
 
 
  
